| Description |
1 online resource (xxi, 297 pages) : color illustrations, color maps |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
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text file |
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PDF |
| Note |
"July 2021"--Cover |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 227-297). |
| Contents |
Executive summary. -- Chapter 1, Introduction, a brief history of reconstruction contracting. -- Chapter 2, USAID, the challenge: selecting what to measure, and how putting M & E to use. -- Chapter 3, State: finding the right metrics to assess progress, measuring the measurable, learning and acting on information. -- Chapter 4, DOD: DOD's approach to M & E has evolved over time, reconstructing the ANDSF, measuring operational effectiveness proved difficult, counterinsurgency through economic development, was the underlying theory valid? -- Chapter 5, International experience and practices: The United States was not alone in struggling with M & E, many key themes from the international experience reinforce those from the United States. -- Chapter 6, Conclusion: findings, lessons, recommendations. -- Appendices & endnotes. |
| Summary |
The report examines how reconstruction contracts have been monitored and evaluated in Afghanistan since 2001. In addition to exploring how agencies applied monitoring and evaluation to individual contracts, the report also analyzes how multiple contracts--for example, portfolios of contracts in sectors like health or education-- were assessed to determine their net effect and overall impact. As U.S. efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan evolved, contractors became a prominent feature of the reconstruction landscape, substantially augmenting U.S. government capacity. However, heavy reliance on contracts also presented significant challenges. Widely documented by SIGAR and others, contingency contracting is notoriously vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse. In unpredictable and chaotic environments such as Afghanistan, poor oversight or improper implementation can threaten relationships with local communities, endanger the lives of U.S. and Afghan government personnel and civilians, and undermine strategic goals. Consequently, proper M & E is vital. We identify findings and lessons from the last two decades of U.S. efforts to apply M & E to reconstruction contracting in Afghanistan. |
| Note |
Description based on online resource, PDF version; title from title page (SIGAR, viewed Sept. 1, 2022). |
| Subject |
Public contracts -- Afghanistan -- Management -- Evaluation.
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Economic assistance, American -- Afghanistan -- Management -- Evaluation.
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Government contractors -- Afghanistan -- Management -- Evaluation.
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Aide économique américaine -- Afghnistn -- Gestion -- Évaluation.
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Fournisseurs du gouvernement -- Afghnistn -- Gestion -- Évaluation.
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Public contracts -- Management -- Evaluation
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Afghanistan https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJjXpC7xxDYf4fj9jQq4v3
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| Added Author |
United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
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| Gpo Item No. |
0876-A-43 (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
S 1.163/3:C 74 |
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