| Description |
xv, 227 pages ; 24 cm. |
|
text txt rdacontent |
|
unmediated n rdamedia |
|
volume nc rdacarrier |
|
Occupation/field of activity group: occ University and college faculty members lcdgt |
|
National/regional group: nat Wisconsinites lcdgt |
| Series |
Studies in constitutional democracy |
|
Studies in constitutional democracy.
|
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Summary |
Most people think that the United States government is composed of three coequal branches. The idea is taught in classrooms across the nation, routinely proclaimed by politicians, and uncritically referenced in the media. This does not, however, square with The Federalist's proclamations that "in Republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates" and "the judiciary is beyond compare the weakest of the three departments of power." In his latest work, David Siemers argues that not only is the notion of three branches equal in power a myth - neither intended by the founders nor true in practice - but one that hinders effective governance. Constitutional myths are not inherently problematic; some are very beneficial, like the idea that "the people" rule. But, as Siemers shows, adherence to the myth of equality has a problematic effect: it normalizes a kind of Newtonian politics in which the actions of any one of the three branches of US government can be checked or stopped by the equal and opposite reaction of any other one. This encourages the belief that institutional checks lay at the center of the founders' constitutional design - and yields gridlock. In response, presidents have come to act ever more unilaterally, effecting change through executive order, memos, executive agreements, and signing statements. The founders envisioned an effective government. They gave each of the three branches a specific job to do: the legislature writes laws, the president executes them, and the judiciary settles controversies under the law. Their plan was for a "separation of functions" rather than a "separation of powers." In this highly original and important new work, Siemers invites us to consider the myth of coequal branches and its negative effects, then proposes a path back to a separation of functions, to a federal government that is at once more faithful to the Constitution and more effective. -- From dust jacket. |
| Contents |
Introduction: The myth of equality -- The public face of contemporary coequality -- The founding generation and interbranch power -- "The relative power of the . . . branches has always ebbed and flowed? -- The Presidency and interbranch power --The Judiciary: guardians of distinctive functions or guardians of coequal branches? -- The "First Branch" becomes coequal -- "We the People" at a crossroads. |
| Subject |
Separation of powers -- United States.
|
|
Constitutional history -- United States.
|
|
Constitutional history. (OCoLC)fst00875777
|
|
Separation of powers. (OCoLC)fst01112740
|
|
United States. (OCoLC)fst01204155
|
| ISBN |
9780826221698 hardcover alkaline paper |
|
0826221696 hardcover alkaline paper |
|
9780826274212 electronic book |
|
0826274218 electronic book |
| Standard No. |
40028714565 |
|
