| Description |
viii, 213 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
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text txt rdacontent |
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unmediated n rdamedia |
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volume nc rdacarrier |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 204-208) and indexes. |
| Contents |
Ch. 1. The realism debates. 1. Introduction: the weakness of 'modest realism'. 2. What is at issue between realists and anti-realists? 3. An outline of our approach. 4. Why logicism must be abandoned. 5. Salvaging the concepts of truth and verisimilitude for science. 6. An inductive strategy for assessing verisimilitude -- Ch. 2. The language of science. 1. The structure of the argument. 2. How kinds are constituted and a type-terminology acquires its meaning. 3. How types are interrelated in hierarchies. 4. Type-hierarchies and natural kinds. 5. How relations among natural kinds are reflected in the structure of type-hierarchies -- Ch. 3. A naturalistic analysis of the use of models in science. 1. Models and theories. 2. What do scientific discourses describe? 3. The modelling relation analysed as type-identity. 4. The analogy structure of a model. 5. The fine structure of the content of some middle-level theories. 6. The plausibility and implausibility of theories. 7. The sources of explanatory models. 8. Theory-families and their virtual worlds as systems -- Ch. 4. Some proposals for the formal analysis of the use of models in science. 1. A summary of the naturalistic treatment of models in physical science. 2. The use of the concept of 'model' in logic and mathematics. 3. Summary of the argument so far. 4. The 'set-theoretic' or 'non-statement' account of models and theories. 5. Icon and Bild: Hertz's account of mechanics. 6. Summary -- Ch. 5. The type-hierarchy approach to models. 1. The traditional account of models. 2. Problems with the traditional approach to models and analogies. 3. The traditional approach to literal and metaphorical language. 4. Type-hierarchies depict literal and metaphorical language. 5. Contrasting the type-hierarchy approach to models with the comparison view. 6. Analogies reconceived. 7. Conclusion -- Ch. 6. Scientific realism and truth. 1. The traditional picture and its problems. 2. Devitt and the rejection of bivalent realism. 3. Similarity and type-hierarchies. 4. An illustration of the type-hierarchy approach to verisimilitude. 5. Truth and verisimilitude. 6. Conclusion: truth and scientific realism -- Ch. 7. Conditionals and the modalities of scientific discourse. 1. The problem of contrary-to-fact conditionals. 2. The 'possible worlds' approach to the interpretation of the modalities of scientific discourse. 3. The 'consequence' approach and the problem of cotenability. 4. An ontological approach to the interpretation of the content of laws of nature. 5. The consequence approach revised. 6. A recipe or procedure for evaluating counterfactuals. 7. Some comparisons between the approaches. 8. Virtual worlds versus possible worlds. 9. Modal verisimilitude -- Ch. 8. A realist theory of properties. 1. Properties in physics: the primary and secondary quality distinction. 2. The conditionality of properties I: simple dispositions. 3. The conditionality of properties II: complex dispositions. 4. The ontosemantics of three new physical properties. 5. Properties in quantum field theory: type-hierarchies again -- Ch. 9. The intersection of metaphysics and epistemology. 1. The argument that would establish realism. 2. The semantic basis of realism summarised. 3. The principle of epistemic invariance. 4. The induction over particulars. 5. The induction over types. 6. The final step: betting on 'truth'. |
| Summary |
Does science give us a progressively more accurate and objective account of the world? This book by three leading philosophers of science presents a new defense of scientific realism against skeptical and positivist attacks. While positivists view scientific theories as devices for predicting observable phenomena, realists maintain that theories describe hidden processes which account for observable phenomena. This problem raises the question: What are scientific theories about? Do they refer to an unobservable yet real realm of physical processes? It seems undeniable that the scientific endeavor has in some sense made progress. But is the increasing practical success of the physical sciences good grounds for believing that their theories and techniques lead us nearer to the truth? According to Aronson, Harre, and Way, past failures to answer these questions have been due in large part to the assumption that knowledge is expressed in propositions and organized by the canons of logic. On the assumption that science must meet the world in a correspondence between statements and states of affairs, realism turns out to be difficult to defend. Realism Rescued offers a new direction, relying on the importance of models in scientific work. Theories are not to be thought of as sets of propositions, though they can be expressed propositionally. Rather they are models, chunks of orderings of natural kinds. For the first time, the indispensability of models is turned into a powerful argument for realism, an argument that confronts the skeptic on his own ground. By drawing on a new technique of knowledge representation developed in Artificial Intelligence, the dynamic type-hierarchy, the authors give a convincing account of the central role of models. Such concepts as verisimilitude, natural kind, natural necessity, and natural law can then be presented far more clearly than ever before. |
| Subject |
Realism.
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Science -- Methodology.
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Research -- Methodology.
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Realism. (OCoLC)fst01091228
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Research -- Methodology.
(OCoLC)fst01095216
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Science -- Methodology.
(OCoLC)fst01108313
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| Added Author |
Harré, Rom.
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Way, Eileen Cornell.
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| ISBN |
0812692888 |
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9780812692884 |
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0812692896 (pbk.) |
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9780812692891 (pbk.) |
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