| Description |
xv, 227 pages ; 24 cm |
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text txt rdacontent |
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unmediated n rdamedia |
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volume nc rdacarrier |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 215-221) and index. |
| Contents |
Ch. 1. Confidence -- I. Decision Problem -- II. Five Principles -- III. Decision Problem Solved -- IV. Modest Probabilism -- V. Sin of False Precision -- VI. Countable Additivity -- VII. Philosophical Objections -- Ch. 2. Evidence -- I. Puzzle about Evidence -- II. Evidence and Confidence -- III. Puzzle Solved -- IV. "Popperian Animadversions" -- V. Evidence and Conditionalization -- VI. Argument for Conditionalization -- VII. Argument Disarmed -- VIII. Reflection -- IX. Evidence: Quality vs. Quantity -- X. Subjectivism -- Ch. 3. Bayesian Challenge -- I. What about Belief? -- II. Certainty View -- III. Confidence Threshold View -- IV. Bayesian Challenge -- Ch. 4. Rational Belief -- I. Bayesian Challenge Revisited -- II. Acting on Beliefs -- III. Assertion View -- IV. Deductive Cogency: A Puzzle -- V. Structural Soundness -- VI. Adjudicating between Theories -- VII. Global Interests -- VIII. Puzzle Solved -- IX. Believing the Improbable -- X. Assertion View: Objections -- Ch. 5. Bayesian Canon -- I. Dutch Book Argument -- II. Ramsey's Utility Theory -- III. Degrees of Belief Constrained -- IV. Three Objections -- V. Savage and Jeffrey -- Ch. 6. Decision Theory as Epistemology -- I. Staking the Claim -- II. Naturalists Object -- III. Methodological Moral. Appendix 1: Principles and Definitions -- Appendix 2: Proofs -- Appendix 3: Probabilism -- Some Elementary Theorems. |
| Summary |
It has been over sixty years since Ramsey first argued for the significance of decision theory to epistemology. Yet many philosophers remain unconvinced. The familiar probabilistic constraints decision theory imposes on opinion and confirmation seem too demanding, too prudential in nature and too tangential to our concern with the propriety of categorical belief and knowledge. How important are these concerns? Mark Kaplan argues that they are very important - but that a properly modified and interpreted Bayesian decision theory can meet them. His brief is that, suitably formulated, Bayesian decision theory is of the most profound philosophical consequence to the way we are accustomed to think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. Kaplan makes his case in a clear and compelling way, and with a minimum of technical detail. The modest variant of Bayesian decision theory to which he appeals is new, well-motivated and easy to follow. Most proofs are relegated to an appendix. A brief primer on probability is also provided. This book is not just an original contribution to Bayesian epistemology. It is also the most accessible treatment available of the relation Bayesian epistemology bears to the rest of the field. |
| Subject |
Decision making.
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Knowledge, Theory of.
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Science -- Philosophy.
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Decision making. (OCoLC)fst00889035
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Knowledge, Theory of. (OCoLC)fst00988194
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Science -- Philosophy.
(OCoLC)fst01108336
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| ISBN |
0521475058 (hardback) |
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9780521475051 (hardback) |
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9780521624961 |
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0521624967 |
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