| Description |
1 online resource (1 electronic resource (xii, 184 pages)) |
|
text txt rdacontent |
|
computer c rdamedia |
|
online resource cr rdacarrier |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome. rdacc http://rdaregistry.info/termList/RDAColourContent/1003 |
| Description |
data file |
|
Bibliography |
| Series |
New comparative politics |
|
New comparative politics.
|
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-178) and index. |
| Contents |
Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power. |
| Note |
Print version record; resource not viewed. |
| Summary |
Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving an organization is extremely unlikely. For example, small European states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto--or veto threat--has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration. |
| Note |
This work is licensed by Knowledge Unlatched under a Creative Commons license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode |
| Language |
In English. |
| Access |
Open Access EbpS |
| Subject |
European Union.
|
|
European Union
|
|
European Union countries -- Politics and government.
|
|
Legislative veto -- European Union countries.
|
|
Veto législatif -- Pays de l'Union européenne.
|
|
HISTORY -- Europe -- General.
|
|
LAW -- International.
|
|
HISTORY -- Europe -- General.
|
|
Legislative veto
|
|
Politics and government
|
|
European Union countries
|
| Added Title |
Institutional design in the European Union |
|
Institutional design in the EU |
| Other Form: |
Print version: Veto power. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, ©2011 9780472117932 (DLC) 2012419059 |
| ISBN |
9780472027750 (electronic bk.) |
|
0472027751 (electronic bk.) |
|
9780472900794 (electronic bk.) |
|
047290079X (electronic bk.) |
|
9780472117932 (cloth ; alk. paper) |
|
0472117939 (cloth ; alk. paper) |
|
1283334380 |
|
9781283334389 |
| Standard No. |
9786613334381 |
|
10.3998/mpub.2012704 |
|
AU@ 000053288276 |
|
CHNEW 000950729 |
|
CHVBK 48351781X |
|
DEBBG BV043624650 |
|
DEBBG BV044115306 |
|
DEBSZ 449821595 |
|
DEBSZ 48470561X |
|
GBVCP 1008656259 |
|
GBVCP 896606104 |
|
NZ1 14249171 |
|
AU@ 000075792330 |
|
