| Description |
xix, 768 p. : ill. ; 26 cm. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 683-747) and indexes. |
| Contents |
Introduction -- The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency -- The reason for collective choice - redistribution -- The choice of voting rule -- Majority rule - positive properties -- Majority rule - normative properties -- Simple alternatives to majority rule -- Complicated alternatives to majority rule -- Exit, voice, and disloyalty -- Federalism -- Two-party competition - deterministic voting -- Two-party competition - probabilistic voting -- Multiparty systems -- The paradox of voting -- Rent seeking -- Bureaucracy -- Legislatures and bureaucracies -- Dictatorship. |
|
Political competition and macroeconomic performance -- Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying -- The size of government -- Government size and economic performance -- Social welfare functions -- The impossibility of social ordering -- A just social contract -- Constitution as a utilitarian contract -- Liberal rights and social choices -- Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics? -- Allocation, redistribution, and public choice. |
| Subject |
Elections.
|
|
Democracy.
|
|
Social choice.
|
|
Welfare economics.
|
|
State, The.
|
| ISBN |
0521894751 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
|
0521815460 (hbk. : alk. paper) |
|
