The financial crisis inquiry report : final report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States / Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
Examines the causes of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and reveals the weaknesses found in financial regulation, excessive borrowing, and breaches in accountability.
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 465-545).
Contents
PART I: CRISIS ON THE HORIZON: Before our very eyes -- PART II: SETTING THE STAGE: Shadow banking -- Securitization and derivatives -- Deregulation redux -- Subprime lending -- PART III: THE BOOM AND BUST: Credit expansion -- The mortgage machine -- The CDO machine -- All in -- The madness -- The bust -- PART IV: THE UNRAVELING: Early 2007: spreading subprime worries -- Summer 2007: disruptions in funding -- Late 2007 to early 2008: billions in subprime losses -- March 2008: the fall of Bear Stearns -- March to August 2008: systemic risk concerns -- September 2008: the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- September 2008: the bankruptcy of Lehman -- September 2008: the bailout of AIG -- Crisis and panic -- PART V: THE AFTERSHOCKS: The economic fallout -- The foreclosure crisis -- DISSENTING VIEWS: Dissenting statement / Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Bill Thomas -- Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission dissenting statement / Peter J. Wallison.
