| Description |
xvii, 344 p. : ill. ; 25 cm. |
| Contents |
Introduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward. |
| Note |
Includes statistical evidence from a sample of 39 countries, with detailed narratives of nine specific country cases. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-332) and index. |
| Summary |
"Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance." -- Publisher's description. |
| Subject |
Corporate governance.
|
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Corporations -- Investor relations.
|
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Business and politics.
|
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Corporations -- Political activity.
|
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International finance.
|
| Added Author |
Shinn, James.
|
| Spine Title |
Political power & corporate control |
| Added Title |
Global politics of corporate governance |
| ISBN |
0691133816 (pbk.) |
|
0691122911 (alk. paper) |
|
9780691122915 |
|
9780691133812 (pbk.) |
|
