| Edition |
1st Pegasus Books ed. |
| Description |
ix, 223 p. : maps ; 22 cm. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 211-212) and index. |
| Summary |
General Sir Michael Rose exposes a grim reality: Iraqi insurgents have adopted the same guerrilla warfare tactics used during the American Revolution. George Washington commanded a ragtag, undisciplined band of rebels, yet their revolution ended with an American victory. Washington succeeded in defeating the most powerful army in the world--not by engaging in conventional warfare, at which the British excelled, but by waging an insurgency campaign of ambush and indirect attacks. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, and in the followed years, America has found itself fighting a widespread popular insurrection with an army trained for conventional warfare. Like King George and his advisers, President Bush and his cabinet misunderstood the nature of the problem. The British Army learned from its mistakes to remain a dominant world power; the Americans, by contrast, seem to be forgetting the lessons of their founding fathers.--From publisher description. |
| Subject |
Washington, George, 1732-1799 -- Military leadership.
|
|
Military art and science -- United States -- History.
|
|
Iraq War, 2003-2011 -- Campaigns.
|
|
United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Campaigns.
|
| ISBN |
9781605980355 (sc.) |
|
1605980358 (sc.) |
|
1933648775 (hbk.) |
|
9781933648774 |
|
