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Actions needed to better assess and coordinate capacity-building efforts at the Ministry of Agricult

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

Afghan First initiative has placed work with Afghan companies, but is affected by inconsistent contr

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Afghan National Security University has experienced cost growth and schedule delays, and contract ad

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

ANA facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat generally met construction requirements, but contractor o

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

Better planning and oversight could have reduced construction delays and costs at the Kabul Military

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasi

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Despite improvements in MoI's personnel systems additional actions are needed to completely verify A

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

DOD improved its accountability for vehicles provided to the Afghan national security forces, but sh

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan infrastructure fund projects are behind schedule and lack adequate sust

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Increases in security costs are likely under the Afghan public protection force USAID needs to monit

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Outstanding financial audit recommendations to State.

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, author.
[Arlington, Va.] : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2023. 2023

Progress made toward increased stability under USAID's Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East Pro

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Selected public diplomacy awards mostly achieved objectives, but embassy can take steps to enhance g

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

Limited interagency coordination and insufficient controls over U.S. funds in Afghanistan hamper U.S

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

U.S. agencies have provided training and support to Afghanistan's major crimes task force, but repor

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan has cost nearly $2 billion, and state should continue to str

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011

USAID has disbursed $9.5 billion for reconstruction and funded some financial audits as required, bu

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

USAID spent almost $400 million on an Afghan stabilization project despite uncertain results, but ha

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2012] 2012

USAID's Goldozi Project : audit of costs incurred by FHI 360

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, author.
Arlington, VA : Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2022. 2022

USAID's Kabul community development program largely met the agreement's terms, but progress toward l

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, [2011] 2011