| Description |
1 online resource (xii, 77 pages) |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
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text file PDF rda |
| Note |
"December 2016." |
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Print version available for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 69-77). |
| Contents |
Introduction -- Defining terms and seeking clarity. Insurgency -- Counterinsurgency (COIN) -- Doctrine and strategy -- COIN, American style. Frontier warfare -- The Philippines and Latin America -- Vietnam -- El Salvador -- Iraq and the resurgence of U.S. COIN -- COINdinistas and COINtras : the COIN debate -- COINdinistas -- COINtras -- Moderate critics -- Coercion versus hearts and minds -- From rhetoric to reality -- U.S. COIN doctrine. The FM 3-24 (2006) -- The FM 3-24 (2014) -- Current capability. Force structure -- Special Operations Command (SOCOM) -- Learning institutions -- Contemporary security environment. Quadrennial Defense Review -- DIA annual worldwide threat assessment -- National military strategy -- Current strategy and the role of COIN. From threat assessment to defense strategy -- Matching capabilities is not strategy -- COIN and the U.S. military. Current U.S. strategy -- Prioritizing threats -- COIN and U.S. strategy -- Options -- Recommendations. Prepare for conflict across the threat spectrum but prioritize threats -- Keep primary responsibility for COIN in SOCOM -- Develop COIN surge capacity -- Preserve learning institutions -- Embrace a more expansive concept of COIN -- Avoid expeditionary COIN -- Provide assistance with small advisory missions -- Implications for U.S. land power -- Conclusion. |
| Summary |
"Counterinsurgency (COIN) continues to be a controversial subject among military leaders. Critics argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made the U.S. military, particularly the Army, 'COIN-centric.' They maintain that equipping U.S. forces to combat insurgency has eroded their conventional war fighting capabilities. Those committed to preserving and even enhancing COIN capabilities, on the other hand, insist that doing so need not compromise the ability of the military to perform other tasks. They also point out that the likelihood of even a mid-level conventional war remains low while the probability of unconventional engagements is high. This monograph reviews the COIN debate, analyzes current force structure, and concludes that contrary to the more extreme positions taken by critics and proponents, the U.S. military has achieved a healthy balance between COIN and other capabilities"--Publisher's web site. |
| Note |
Online resource, PDF version; title from PDF title page (SSI, viewed December 19, 2016). |
| Subject |
United States. Army -- Operational readiness.
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United States. Army. (OCoLC)fst00533532
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Counterinsurgency -- United States.
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Strategy.
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United States -- Armed Forces -- Operational readiness.
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Armed Forces -- Operational readiness.
(OCoLC)fst01351844
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Counterinsurgency. (OCoLC)fst00881325
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Strategy. (OCoLC)fst01134406
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United States. (OCoLC)fst01204155
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| Added Author |
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute, publisher.
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Army War College (U.S.). Press, publisher.
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| Added Title |
Counterinsurgency conundrum |
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Future of counterinsurgency and United States land power |
| ISBN |
1584877413 |
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9781584877417 |
| Standard No. |
NLGGC 408566558 |
| Gpo Item No. |
0307-A-31 (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
D 101.146:C 83/4 |
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