| Description |
1 online (39 p.) |
| Series |
Peaceworks ; no. 62. |
|
Peaceworks no. 62.
|
| Note |
Title from PDF cover (usip.org, viewed Nov. 27, 2009). |
|
"First published August 2009." |
| Summary |
In Afghanistan's poppy-rich south and southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from narcotics, probes how traffickers influence the strategic goals of the insurgency, and considers the extent to which narcotics are changing the nature of the insurgency itself. With thousands more U.S. troops deploying o Afghanistan, joined by hundreds of civilian partners as part of Washington's reshaped strategy toward the region, understanding the nexus between traffickers and the Taliban could help build strategies to weaken the insurgents and to extend governance. This report argues that it is no longer possible to treat the insurgency and the drug trade as separate matters, to be handled by military and law enforcement, respectively. This report illustrates how--for more than three decades of conflict in Afghanistan--the opium trade has become deeply embedded in the politics of the region. Key players and families tied to opium smuggling, trafficking routes, and methods of laundering drug money have remained remarkably unchanged. So too has the West's willingness to downplay the problem, repeatedly viewing narcotics as a 'lesser evil' to the greater challenge at hand. Since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, the poppy trade has played a critical destabilizing role, both in corrupting the Afghan government and police and in bankrolling the resurgence of the Taliban. This study shows how Taliban commanders on the village level have expanded their activities related to drugs from collecting extortion and charging protection fees to running heroin refineries and engaging in kidnapping and other smuggling schemes. As insurgent commanders become more deeply tied to criminal activity, it will become more difficult for the coalition of foreign forces in Afghanistan to defeat them. Although there is wide variation across the war theater, drug profits flow up the chain of command within the Taliban and other insurgent and extremist organizations operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. These funds appear to play a key role in funding the operational costs of the Taliban and many of these other groups. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Contents |
Introduction -- A brief history -- The neo-Taliban -- Key challenges -- Conclusion. |
| Funding |
The research for this publication was supported through a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. |
| Subject |
Opium trade -- Afghanistan.
|
|
Drug traffic -- Afghanistan.
|
|
Taliban.
|
|
Afghanistan -- Economic conditions.
|
|
Afghanistan -- Politics and government -- 2001-
|
|
United States -- Foreign relations -- Afghanistan.
|
|
Afghanistan -- Foreign relations -- United States.
|
| Added Author |
United States Institute of Peace.
|
| Other Form: |
i Print version: How opium profits the Taliban 39 p. (OCoLC)421950254 |
| ISBN |
9781601270320 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
|
1601270321 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
| Standard No. |
NZ1 13127424 |
| Gpo Item No. |
1063-K-11 (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
Y 3.P 31:19/NO.62 |
|
