| Description |
xxxiv, 430 p. : ill., maps ; 21 cm. |
| Note |
Originally published: 2009. With a new afterword. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (p. [345]-416) and index. |
| Contents |
Descent into violence -- The mujahideen era -- Uncivil war -- The rise of the Taliban -- Al Qa'ida's strategic alliance -- Operation Enduring Freedom -- Light footprint -- Early successes -- The logic of insurgency -- Collapse of law and order -- A growing cancer -- The perfect storm -- A three-front war -- National caveats -- The water must boil -- Al Qa'ida : a force multiplier -- In the eye of the storm -- Back to the future. |
| Summary |
"Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The U.S. established security throughout the country--killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa'ida's senior operatives--and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001, planning for the Iraq War siphoned resources and personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. Jones introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. He then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence"--From publisher. |
| Subject |
Afghan War, 2001-2021.
|
|
Counterinsurgency -- Afghanistan.
|
|
Afghanistan -- Politics and government -- 2001-
|
|
Taliban.
|
| ISBN |
9780393338515 (pbk.) |
|
0393338517 (pbk.) |
|
