| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 60 pages). |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
| Series |
Monograph series / Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College
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| Note |
"August 2022." |
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In scope of the U.S. Government Publishing Office Cataloging and Indexing Program (C&I) and Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP). |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Summary |
This monograph arose out of conversations with military planners on US Army and Combatant Command staffs about the desire for a better understanding of how competition below the threshold of war works and how the military can play a more effective role. Part of the problem appears to be military practitioners often do not adequately distinguish between defeating enemies and coercing them. Whereas the former involves eliminating an enemy's choice, the latter involves bargaining intended to convince the enemy to choose cooperation. Bargaining suggests one must cede dominance and initiative to the other side as well as engage in unseemly manipulation to regain the dominance and initiative. Perhaps more importantly, bargaining works against the logic and grammar of military operations. Military forces win when they destroy--or, at least, neutralize--enemy forces faster than the latter can destroy or neutralize the former. When the goal is not to destroy enemy military forces, military forces may still have utility, but the logic and grammar of employing them is less clear. This monograph seeks to clarify how coercion works so military practitioners can better calibrate demands, deterrent measures, and support for partners to secure vital US interests. For this discussion, logic is a function of the purpose of an activity, and grammar comprises the rules by which the activity functions. To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that emphasize decision-making processes and their associated logic as well as the attributes--rational or not--of the decisionmakers themselves. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand the grammar of coercion better. Models are rarely accurate enough to make reliable predictions, and actors frequently are not rational. By understanding the underlying logic of how various actors, sometimes playing different roles, determine and act on preferences, one can generate general "rules of thumb" (ROTs) for using the tools of international competition. As Cold War scholar Thomas J. Schelling observed, "the power to hurt and the power to seize" are different. Schelling saw strategic competition as a kind of bargaining--one in which gainsfor one side reflect a loss for the other side. Under such conditions, a range of outcomes are better for both sides than no agreement, but because any one of these outcomes still representsa better deal for one than the other, any agreement entails a concession by one side. As Schellingfurther points out, actors concede when they come to the belief their opponent will not concede,and, as a result, the former must choose between no agreement and agreeing on a less optimaloption. This bargaining can be explicit, wherein adversaries negotiate directly, or tacit, wherein each adversary observes and interprets the actions of the other while being aware the other isdoing the same. Successful coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one's own cause. This analysis describes the logic of various competitive interactions to assist military and policy planners in developing effective policies to facilitate US advantage in strategic competition. |
| Note |
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (Army War College, viewed Nov. 10, 2022). |
| Subject |
United States -- Foreign relations -- 21st century.
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Competition, International.
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Games of strategy (Mathematics)
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États-Unis -- Relations extérieures -- 21e siècle.
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Concurrence internationale.
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Jeux de stratégie (Mathématiques)
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Competition, International
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Diplomatic relations
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Games of strategy (Mathematics)
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United States https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq
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| Chronological Term |
2000-2099
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| Added Author |
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute, issuing body.
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| Added Title |
Grammar of coercion in the twenty-first century |
| ISBN |
1584878398 pdf |
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9781584878391 pdf |
| Gpo Item No. |
0307-A-31 (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
D 101.146:C 65 |
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