| Description |
1 online resource (xxxi, 308 pages) : color illustrations, maps |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
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text file PDF rda |
| Series |
Rand Corporation monograph series |
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Rand Corporation monograph series.
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| Note |
"Prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense." |
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"National Defense Research Institute." |
| Summary |
Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-308). |
| Contents |
Introduction -- Concepts that shape counterinsurgency assessment -- Centralized assessment theory and pattern and trend analysis -- The effects-based approach to assessment -- Choosing core metrics -- Vietnam-era assessment -- Assessment in Afghanistan -- Why does centralized assessment fail in counterinsurgency? -- Conclusions, recommendations, and options -- A proposed alternative to centralized assessment. |
| Note |
Print version record. |
| Language |
English. |
| Subject |
Counterinsurgency -- Evaluation.
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Contre-rébellion -- Évaluation.
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HISTORY -- Revolutionary.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Intelligence & Espionage.
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Afghanistan https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJjXpC7xxDYf4fj9jQq4v3
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United States https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq
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Vietnam https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJjhFyhTBdYgGbRpV6YwYP
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counterinsurgency.
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| Added Author |
National Defense Research Institute (U.S.)
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Rand Corporation.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Connable, Ben. Embracing the fog of war. Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2012 9780833058157 (DLC) 2012001598 (OCoLC)774021168 |
| ISBN |
9780833068408 (electronic bk.) |
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0833068407 (electronic bk.) |
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9780833068385 (electronic bk.) |
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0833068385 (electronic bk.) |
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9780833058157 (pbk. ; alk. paper) |
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0833058150 (pbk. ; alk. paper) |
| Standard No. |
AU@ 000051478735 |
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AU@ 000061157070 |
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DEBBG BV044164412 |
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GBVCP 1008656976 |
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AU@ 000048527858 |
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