| Description |
1 online resource (ix, 70 pages) : illustrations. |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
| Series |
Wright flyer paper ; no. 80 |
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Wright flyer paper ; no. 80.
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| Note |
At head of title: Air University, Air Command and Staff College. |
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"Accepted by Air University Press November 2019 and published April 2021"--Page ii. |
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In scope of the U.S. Government Publishing Office Cataloging and Indexing Program (C&I) and Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP). |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 66-70). |
| Contents |
Introduction -- Background and Literature Review -- Russian Deterrence and Perceptions -- The Missile Defense Response -- ABM Treaty, Missile Defense, and the Link to Offensive -- Arms Treaties -- The Future of Global Missile Defense -- Methodology/Explanation of Scenarios -- Scenario Key Drivers -- Analysis of Scenario Results -- Discussion of Results -- Conclusions -- Recommendations -- Appendix A: Detailed Explanation of Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Scenario -- Appendix B: Detailed Explanation of Future BMD Scenario -- Appendix C: Detailed Explanation of Current and Future Russian Nuclear Force -- Appendix D: Full Simulation Results. |
| Summary |
"Since the US left the ABM Treaty in 2002, the prevailing assumption has been that Russia's consistent concerns with the limited US ballistic missile defense (BMD) system was political bluster, because its nuclear deterrent was large enough to easily defeat any US defenses. Previous studies generally based their arguments on a faulty understanding of Moscow's deterrence requirements, assuming it would accept a minimum deterrence standard of only a few warheads surviving to detonation. The following study shows that Moscow desires a credible threat of unacceptable damage to deter the United States and that an expanding US ballistic missile defense (BMD) system could prevent Russia from achieving this criterion and ultimately degrade bilateral strategic stability. The analysis uses a scenario planning framework to compare four future scenarios of US BMD versus Russia's nuclear deterrent. These comparisons demonstrate that unchecked expansion of the US missile defense system, especially when combined with future arms limitations, will cause legitimate concern in Russia over its ability to deter the United States during a crisis. Moscow's reduced confidence will continue to compel it to find new capabilities to penetrate and circumvent missile defense in order to restore balance, degrading arms race stability between the United States and Russia. Any further BMD expansion will further degrade strategic stability and put at risk future arms control agreements."--Abstract |
| Note |
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (Air University Press website, viewed on April 21, 2021). |
| Subject |
United States -- Foreign relations -- Russia (Federation)
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Russia (Federation) -- Foreign relations -- United States.
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Arms control -- Russia (Federation)
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Arms race -- Forecasting.
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Deterrence (Strategy)
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Russia (Federation) -- Military policy.
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Ballistic missile defenses -- United States.
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États-Unis -- Relations extérieures -- Russie.
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Armements -- Contrôle -- Russie.
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Course aux armements -- Prévision.
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Dissuasion (Stratégie)
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Défense antimissile -- États-Unis.
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Arms control. (OCoLC)fst00814908
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Ballistic missile defenses. (OCoLC)fst00826083
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Deterrence (Strategy) (OCoLC)fst00891658
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Diplomatic relations. (OCoLC)fst01907412
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Military policy. (OCoLC)fst01021386
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Russia (Federation) (OCoLC)fst01262050 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJhhmCp3jtcMQbx3WgpXVC
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United States. (OCoLC)fst01204155 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq
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| Added Author |
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College, issuing body.
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Air University (U.S.). Press, publisher.
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| Added Title |
Maintaining strategic stability with Russia while expanding global missile defense |
| Gpo Item No. |
0422-K-09 (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
D 301.26/30:80 |
