| Description |
xvi, 408 pages, 8 unnumber pages of plates : illustrations ; 24 cm |
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text txt rdacontent |
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unmediated n rdamedia |
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volume nc rdacarrier |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 324-393) and index. |
| Contents |
Introduction: The premises of Stalin's foreign policy -- 'Potential enemies' : London and Moscow at Loggerheads -- 'The truce of the bear' -- 'He who sups with the devil' -- Cripps's mission to Moscow -- The scramble for the Balkans -- Soviet-Italian collusion -- The Soviet seizure of Bessarabia -- British schemes for the Balkans -- The Vienna award : the German encroachment in the Balkans -- Clash over the Danube -- On a collision course -- Drang nach Osten : the initial plans -- Soviet intelligence and the German threat -- The Bulgarian corridor to the Turkish Straits -- The road to 'Barbarossa' -- Molotov's visit to Berlin -- Hitler opts for war -- Postscript : preventive war? -- The curtain falls on the Balkans -- The British perspective : co-operation or embroilment? -- Bulgaria turns to the Axis -- The urge for the Straits -- The Red Army alert -- The Soviet defence plans -- The bankruptcy of the military -- The gathering clouds -- At the crossroads : the Yugoslav coup d'etat -- Churchill's warning to Stalin -- British intelligence and 'Barbarosa' -- The 'cryptic' warning -- Rumours of war and a separate peace -- The bogy of a separate peace -- Aftermath -- Japan : the avenue to Germany -- 'Appeasement' : a new German-Soviet pact? -- 'The special threatening military period' -- On the alert -- Emergency deployment -- The flight of Rudolf Hess to England -- The conspiracy -- The mission -- Fictitious negotiations -- 'Running the Bolshevik hare' -- Hess as perceived by the Kremlin -- On the eve of war -- 'Mobilization is war!' -- A Middle East diversion : the flaw in British intelligence -- The TASS communique -- Calamity -- Self-deception -- London : 'this avalanche breathing fire and death' -- 22 June 1941 : the long weekend -- Conclusion. |
| Summary |
"Grand Delusion draws on crucial new documentation to unravel the mystery of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 and Stalin's enigmatic behaviour on the eve of the attack. Gabriel Gorodetsky challenges both the Russian revisionist view--that Stalin was about to invade Germany when Hitler made a preemptive strike, and the Cold War version popular in the West--that Stalin was simply outwitted. Instead he shows Stalin as rational and level headed--though unscrupulous--pursuing well-defined geopolitical interests, actively negotiating for European peace." "Gorodetsky bases his argument on the most thorough scrutiny ever of Soviet archives for the period, including the files of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, the security forces, and the entire range of military intelligence available to Stalin on the eve of 'Operation Barbarossa'."--Jacket. |
| Subject |
Stalin, Joseph, 1878-1953.
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World War, 1939-1945 -- Soviet Union.
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World War, 1939-1945 -- Diplomatic history.
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Stalin, Joseph, 1878-1953 (OCoLC)fst00053304
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Diplomatic history. (OCoLC)fst01905576
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Soviet Union. (OCoLC)fst01210281
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World War (1939-1945) (OCoLC)fst01180924 |
| Chronological Term |
1939-1945
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| ISBN |
0300077920 (cloth ; alk. paper) |
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9780300077926 (cloth ; alk. paper) |
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0300084595 |
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9780300084597 |
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