Description |
xvii, 595 pages : illustrations, maps ; 24 cm |
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unmediated n rdamedia |
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volume nc rdacarrier |
Series |
Cambridge military histories |
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Cambridge military histories.
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Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 550-578) and index. |
Contents |
Hitler's pre-war assessment of the United States and Japan -- Hitler's physical health in autumn 1941 -- 'All measures short of war': the German assessment of American strategy, 1940-1941 -- Forging an unlikely alliance: Germany and Japan, 1933-1941 -- Facing the same dilemma: the US and German quest for rubber -- The crisis of the German war economy, 1940-1941 -- The end of Blitzkrieg? Barbarossa and the impact of Lend-Lease -- The Battle of the Atlantic -- The Luftwaffe on the eve of global war -- The Holocaust. |
Summary |
"In the last days of November 1941, Nazi Germany's strategic situation was ambiguous: her armies were in possession of most of continental Europe and fighting deep inside the USSR, but the momentum of the Wehrmacht's war machine appeared to be spending itself. In relation to the numbers of U-boats available, sinkings had been dropping since June; her surface fleet was unlikely to pick up the slack, since it had just had fuel restrictions imposed on it which all but ruled out a resumption of Atlantic operations. In the air, nighttime RAF bombing raids were becoming a feature of everyday life, and reaching deeper and deeper into areas of the German geography thus far untouched. On the Russian front, which consumed most of the army's and air force's assets, operations aimed at rendering the situation of the defenders of Leningrad and Moscow untenable and force the surrender of those of Sevastopol, were still in progress. On the downside, Army Group South had just been forced to abandon its most recent prize - the city of Rostov - to the counterattacking Red Army, an event that definitely had to be rated as a 'first' in the annals of the Russo- German war. Crucially, the war economy which needed to deliver a maximum output if the armed forces of the Third Reich were to have even a remote chance of meeting the conflicting priorities set by their warlord, had entered a period of crisis, with neither enough labour nor raw materials available to meet the demands for 1942"-- Provided by publisher. |
Subject |
Germany -- Foreign relations -- United States.
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United States -- Foreign relations -- Germany.
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Hitler, Adolf, 1889-1945.
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World War, 1939-1945 -- Causes.
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World War, 1939-1945 -- Germany.
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World War, 1939-1945 -- United States.
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Hitler, Adolf, 1889-1945. (OCoLC)fst00034591
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Diplomatic relations. (OCoLC)fst01907412
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War -- Causes.
(OCoLC)fst01170331
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Germany. (OCoLC)fst01210272
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United States. (OCoLC)fst01204155
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World War (1939-1945) (OCoLC)fst01180924 |
Chronological Term |
1939-1945
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Added Title |
Why Germany declared war on the United States |
ISBN |
9781108834919 (hardcover) |
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1108834914 (hardcover) |
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9781108870405 electronic book |
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9781108883252 electronic book |
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