| Description |
1 online resource |
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text rdacontent |
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computer rdamedia |
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online resource rdacarrier |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Contents |
Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses. |
| Note |
Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher. |
| Summary |
"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover. |
| Subject |
United States. Air Force -- Organization.
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United States. Air Force -- Decision making.
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États-Unis. Air Force -- Organisation.
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États-Unis. Air Force -- Prise de décision.
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United States. Air Force
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Information warfare -- United States.
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Escalation (Military science)
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Cyberspace -- Security measures.
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Crisis management -- Government policy -- United States.
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Cyberterrorism -- Prevention.
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Conflict management.
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Guerre de l'information -- États-Unis.
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Escalade (Science militaire)
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Gestion de crise -- Politique gouvernementale -- États-Unis.
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Gestion des conflits.
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Armed Forces -- Organization
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Conflict management
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Cyberspace -- Security measures
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Cyberterrorism -- Prevention
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Escalation (Military science)
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Information warfare
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United States
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Libicki, Martin C. Crisis and escalation in cyberspace Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2012] 9780833076786 (DLC) 2012046227 |
| ISBN |
9780833076809 (epub) |
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0833076809 |
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9780833076816 (prc) |
|
0833076817 |
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9780833076793 ( ebook/pdf) |
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0833076795 |
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9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
| Standard No. |
AU@ 000050186484 |
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AU@ 000053309560 |
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DEBBG BV043036689 |
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DEBBG BV044062972 |
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DEBSZ 421231343 |
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GBVCP 1008657905 |
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NZ1 15590520 |
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