It is inherently speculative to address future foreign perceptions of chemical weapons (CW) utility. This is not only because it concerns things that may be, rather than things that already are, but also because those who might be considering or already pursuing CW capabilities for the future will not be openly sharing their views. Classified sources and assessments also cannot be addressed in this unclassified forum. This paper, therefore, offers some educated guesses about how rational actors might view the future utility of CW on the basis of open source information about relevant technological trends and assumptions about pertinent aspects of the future international security environment. For any type of weapon, and particularly for one proscribed by treaty, three factors should be assessed when attempting to gauge future foreign perceptions of that weapon's utility: the nature of the future threat, effectiveness of the weapon in countering that threat, and opportunity costs of choosing that weapon over other means of response. These three factors are considered in turn.
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Online resource, PDF version; title from title page (viewed March 9, 2017).
