| Description |
1 online resource (xv, 132 pages) : illustrations |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
| Note |
"December 2003." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Note |
Print version record. |
| Summary |
Ever since the US Army bought its first 3aeroplane4 in 1909, debates have raged over the utility, effectiveness, efficiency, legality, and even the morality of airpower and strategic bombing. Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been colored by accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and simple untruths. If airpower needs criticizing--and certainly there are times when criticism is appropriate--it must be based on accurate information. In Airpower: Myths and Facts, Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, retired, raises points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing and giving our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts. |
| Contents |
1. Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more -- 2. Entering World War II, the Air Corps's unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen -- 3. The Air Corps entered World War II with a "Douhetian" concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children -- 4. Airmen thought they could win the war alone -- 5. The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere -- 6. Bombing was ineffective because it actually stiffened rather than lowered enemy morale -- 7. The atomic bombs were unnecessary because Japan was about to surrender; even if it had not given up, an invasion or continued blockade would have been more humane -- 8. Overall, strategic bombing was a wasted effort that produced only minor effects -- 9. Airpower was a failure in Vietnam, losing the war and letting the Army down. Why even have an Air Force if it can't beat a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam? -- 10. Strategic bombing failed in Vietnam because Rolling Thunder did not break the will of Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts to continue the war -- 11. Airpower was an indiscriminate weapon that killed excessive numbers of Vietnamese civilians -- 12. Too focused on strategic attack during the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force provided inadequate support to ground forces -- 13. Air attack is nothing more than "recreational bombing"; pilots fly so high they can't possibly hit their targets accurately -- 14. Despite all the talk by airmen, the employment of airpower remains an indiscriminate use of military force that deliberately targets civilians. |
| Subject |
United States. Army Air Forces.
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United States. Air Force -- History.
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United States. Army Air Forces -- History.
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United States. Air Force -- History.
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Air power.
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Bombing, Aerial.
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Precision bombing -- Effectiveness.
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HISTORY -- Military -- Aviation.
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| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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| Added Title |
Air power : myths and facts |
| Other Form: |
Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948- Airpower : myths and facts (OCoLC)54885613 |
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Print version: Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948- Airpower. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Air University Press, 2003 1585661244 9781585661244 (DLC) 2004299634 (OCoLC)54388233 |
| ISBN |
9781429456869 (electronic bk.) |
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1429456868 (electronic bk.) |
| Standard No. |
DEBBG BV040921688 |
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NZ1 13111834 |
| Gpo Item No. |
0422-K (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
D 301.26/6:2004017541 |
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