| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 357 pages) : illustrations (chiefly color). |
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text txt rdacontent |
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computer c rdamedia |
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online resource cr rdacarrier |
| Series |
Engineering case studies online
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| Note |
Title from title screen (viewed on Feb. 25, 2011). |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 262-345). |
| Contents |
Foreword -- Executive summary of findings -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Regulatory findings -- Chapter 1: Scope Of Investigation And Methodology -- Nature of report -- Scope of investigation and report -- Investigation methodology -- Structure of the report -- Chapter 2: Drilling For Oil In Deepwater -- Oil and gas in deepwater -- How to drill a deepwater well -- Chapter 3: Background On The Macondo Well, The Deepwater Horizon, And The Companies Involved -- Macondo well -- Deepwater Horizon -- Companies and individuals involved in the Macondo Blowout -- Chapter 4: Technical Findings -- Underlying technical causes -- Underlying management causes -- Chapter 4-1: Flow Path -- Potential flow paths -- Forensic evidence suggests that hydrocarbons did not flow up the annulus and through the seal assembly -- Hydrocarbons appear to have flowed into and up the production casing -- Technical findings -- Chapter 4-2: Well Design -- Deepwater well design -- Macondo well design -- Drilling the Macondo well -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-3: Cement -- Well cementing -- Preparing for the Macondo cement job -- Designing the Macondo cement job -- Planning for and installing centralizers at Macondo -- Float collar installation and conversion at Macondo -- Pre-cementing wellbore conditioning at Macondo -- Cementing process at Macondo -- Float check at Macondo -- Cement evaluation at Macondo -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-4: Foamed Cement Stability -- Foamed cement -- Foamed cement at Macondo -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-5: Temporary Abandonment -- Temporary abandonment -- Temporary abandonment at Macondo -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-6: Negative Pressure Test -- Well integrity tests -- Negative pressure test at Macondo -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-7: Kick Detection -- Well monitoring and kick detection -- Well monitoring at Macondo -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-8: Kick Response -- Well control equipment -- Kick response at Macondo -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-9: Blowout Preventer -- Blind shear rams -- Blind shear ram activation at Macondo -- ROV hot stab activation at Macondo -- Automatic blind shear ram activation at Macondo -- Potential reasons the blind shear ram failed to seal -- BOP recertification -- Technical findings -- Management findings -- Chapter 4-10: Maintenance -- Transocean's rig management system -- Competing interests between drilling and maintenance -- Lack of onshore maintenance -- Maintenance audits and inspections -- Maintenance findings -- Chapter 5: Overarching Failures Of Management -- Leadership -- Communication -- Procedures -- Employees -- Contractors -- Technology -- Risk -- Closing -- Chapter 6: Regulatory Observations -- MMS background -- MMS regulations did not address many key risk factors for the blowout -- BOP recertification -- Ethical considerations -- Endnotes -- Appendix A: Blowout investigation team -- Appendix B: Commission staff -- Appendix C: Acronyms -- Appendix D: Chevron laboratory report cover letter -- Appendix E: Nile and Kaskida -- Schedule when the Deepwater Horizon arrived at Macondo request to suspend operations at Kaskida. |
| Access |
Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL |
| Summary |
From the Back Cover: On April 20, 2010, the Macondo well blew out, costing the lives of 11 men and beginning a catastrophe that sank the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and spilled over 4 million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The spill disrupted an entire region's economy, damaged fisheries and critical habitats, and brought vividly to light the risks of deepwater drilling for oil and gas-the latest frontier in the national energy supply. Soon after, President Barack Obama appointed a seven-member Commission to investigate the disaster, analyze its causes and effects, and recommend the actions necessary to minimize such risks in the future. The Commission's report, supplemented by this Chief Counsel's Report, offers the American public and policymakers alike the fullest account available of what happened in the Gulf and why, and proposes actions-changes in company behavior, reform of government oversight, and investments in research and technology-required as industry moves forward to meet the nation's energy needs. Complementary reports, staff background paper, hearing records, and other materials produced by the Commission are available at www.oilspillcommission.gov. |
| Reproduction |
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2011. MiAaHDL |
| System Details |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
| Processing Action |
digitized 2011 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
| Language |
This edition in English. |
| Subject |
United States. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.
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BP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010.
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Oil spills -- Mexico, Gulf of.
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Offshore oil well drilling -- Mexico, Gulf of -- Management.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: United States. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Macondo (OCoLC)711145259 |
| ISBN |
9780160879630 (paperback) |
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0160879639 (paperback) |
| Gpo Item No. |
0851-J-12 (online) |
| Sudoc No. |
PR 44.8:D 36/M 23 |
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