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Author Haag, William, author.

Title Protecting the integrity of internet routing : border gateway protocol (BGP) route origin validation / William Haag [and three others].

Publication Info. Gaithersburg, MD : National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, 2019.

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Location Call No. OPAC Message Status
 Axe Federal Documents Online  C 13.10:1800-14    ---  Available
Description 1 online resource (257 pages) : color illustrations
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Series NIST special publication ; 1800-14
NIST special publication ; 1800-14.
Note "June 2019."
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references.
Contents volume A. Executive summary -- volume B. Approach, architecture, and security characteristics -- volume C. How-to guides.
Summary The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the default routing protocol to route traffic among internet domains. While BGP performs adequately in identifying viable paths that reflect local routing policies and preferences to destinations, the lack of built-in security allows the protocol to be exploited by route hijacking. Route hijacking occurs when an entity accidentally or maliciously alters an intended route. Such attacks can (1) deny access to internet services, (2) detour internet traffic to permit eavesdropping and to facilitate on-path attacks on end points (sites), (3) misdeliver internet network traffic to malicious end points, (4) undermine internet protocol (IP) address-based reputation and filtering systems, and (5) cause routing instability in the internet. This document describes a security platform that demonstrates how to improve the security of inter-domain routing traffic exchange. The platform provides route origin validation (ROV) by using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) in a manner that mitigates some misconfigurations and malicious attacks associated with route hijacking. The example solutions and architectures presented here are based upon standards-based, open-source, and commercially available products.
Note Online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed June 24, 2019).
Subject BGP (Computer network protocol)
Denial of service attacks.
Internet service providers.
Fournisseurs de services Internet.
Internet service providers.
BGP (Computer network protocol) (OCoLC)fst00824866
Denial of service attacks. (OCoLC)fst01749399
Internet service providers. (OCoLC)fst00977291
Indexed Term Autonomous systems (AS)
Regional Internet Registry (RIR)
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Route hijack
Route origin authorization (ROA)
Route origin validation (ROV)
Routing domain
Added Author National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (U.S.), issuing body.
Gpo Item No. 0247 (online)
Sudoc No. C 13.10:1800-14

 
    
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